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NOTE AND COMMENT
LuBInTy ot' MANUFACTURR TO REMOT4 VNDE VOR D-EPcTIvz AuTo-
MOBILZ WHtM.-Plaintiff. in February. 19O. purchased from the Utica
Motor Car Company, a Cadillac six-passenger touring car, manufactured by
the Cadillac Motor Car Company, of Michigan. The Utica company was a
dealer in motor cars, and purchased to resell; it was the original vendee, and
the plaintiff was the sub-vendee.
The car was used very little until July 31, i909, when the plaintiff, an
experienced driver, while driving the car on a main public road in good
condition, at a speed of 12 to 15 miles per hour, was severely and perma-
nently injured by the right front wheel suddenly breaking down and the
car turning over on him.
He commenced action in the Supreme Court of New York in I91O. This
was removed to the Federal Court for the Northern District of New York,
where he had judgment for $8,ooo. This was reversed by the Circuit Court
of Appeals, (LaCombe, Coxe,' and Ward, JJ.), in an opinion by Ward, J,
Coxe, J., dissenting, (221 Fed. 8oi, I915).
The action was tried again, without a jury. The court found that the
injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendant; that the plaintiff
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was free from contributory negligence; and that the damages amounted to
$io,ooo. Yet, relying on the former decision of the Court of Appeals, the
court gave judgment for the defendant. The court also found: that the
automobile was manufactured, assembled, and put on the market by the
defendant with a weak and defective wheel; that this was the proximate
cause of the accident; that the car when put on the market, was dangerous
to human life; that defendant ought to have knpwn this. and had it exer-
cised ordinary care would have known it; that although the defendant did not
manufacture, but purchased, the wheels, it carelessly failed to use reasonable
inspection and tests to discover the real condition and weakness of the wheels.
The complaint was based on negligence only. There was no allegation of
fraudulent representations by the defendant. Evidence, however, was ad-
mitted to the effect, and the judge found, that the defendant, in its catalogue
represented that its cars were equipped with the best wheels obtainable, equal
to those used on the highest priced cars; of the artillery type, made from
well seasoned second growth hickory, with steel hubs and spokes of ample
dimensions to insure great strength; and that the plaintiff relied on these
representations.
On the former appeal, the question was the same as here, i. e., whether
the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, not being the immediate
purchaser, but the sub-vendee, and it was held that since there was no
contractual relation between the plaintiff and the defendant, there could be
no recovery. The court then said: "One who manufactures articles inher-
ently dangerous, e. g., poisons, dynamite, gunpowder, torpedoes, bottles of
water under gas pressure,-is liable in tort to third parties which they injure,
unless he prove that he has exercised reasonable care with reference to the
article manufactured. * * * On the other hand, one who manufactures articles
dangerous only if defectively made or installed, e. g., tables, chairs, pictures
or mirrors hung on the walls, or carriages, automobiles, and so on,--is not
liable to third parties for injuries caused by them except in case of willful
injury or fraud:'
On this appeal the defendant relied on the rule "that whatever has been
decided on one appeal cannot be re-examined on a second appeal in the
same suit." While the court admitted this was the general rule, yet, by
Rogers, J., it said this is a rule "of public policy of private peace," but not an
inexorable one, "and should not be adhered to in a case in which the court
has committed an error which results in injustice, and at the sanle time lays
down a principle of law for, future guidance which is unsound and 'contrary
to the interests of society. * * * We shall not consider at length the reasons
which have satisfied us that a serious mistake was made in the first decision.
The reasons may be found in the opinion in" MacPherson v. Buick Motof
Co., 2,7 N. Y. 382, decided since the former decision in this case. 'We can-
not believe that the liability of a manufacturer of automobiles has any analogy
to the liability of a manufacturer of tables, chairs, pictures or mirrors hung
on the walls. The analogy is rather that of the manufacturer of unwhole-"
some food or of a poisonous drug. It is every bit as dangerous to put upon
the market an automobile with rotten spokes as it is to send out to the
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trade rotten foodstuffs." (Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 247 Fed. 921). The
judgment was, therefore, reversed, Manton, J., concurring with Rogers, J.,
and Ward, J., dissenting, on the ground that the former decision was the
law of the case and was res judicata. Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co.,
(1919) 261 Fed. 878. The opinion of Ray, J., in the District Court (I94 Fed.
497), is valuable.
The history of this case illustrates the difficulty the courts have with the
problem involved. Beginning with Langridge v. Levy in x837. (2 M. & W.
51W. 4 M. & W. 337). D. who falsely warranted to P's father, who purchased
for use of himself and his sons, the make of a gun which burst and in-
jured P while he was using it. was held liable to P. In Winterbottorn v.
Wright, (z842), io M. & W. iog, P, relying on a contract between D and
the Postmaster General to keep in repair, the mail coaches to be used by P's
employer who had contracted to carry the mails, was not allowed to recover
damages for an injury caused by the breaking down of the coach which P
was driving, due to D's failure to keep in repair as agreed. In Longmeid v.
Holliday, (85i), 6 Exch. 761, P could not recover for injury from the ex-
plosion of a defective lamp which P's husband had purchased for the use
of himself and his wife, from D who did not make the lamp, know of the
defect, or make any representations concerning it, although the husband had
an action against D on an implied warranty that the lamp was sound. IA
Thomas v. Winchester, (1852), 6 N.'Y. 397, P was allowed to recover for
injury from taking belladonna (poison), used in a prescription calling for
dandelion (harmless), filled by a retail druggist from a bottle falsely labeled
'dandelion,' purchased from a wholesale druggist, who bought from D, the
manfacturer, whose employee had negligently mislabeled the bottle,-on
the ground of the inherently dangerous character of the poisonous drug.
These are the foundation cases.
In Huset v. Threshing Machine Co., (i9o3), i~o Fed. 865, Judge SANmom
xeviewed the cases, and formulated the matter thus: The general rule is that
the manufacturer is not liable to third parties who have no contractual rela-
tions with him for negligence in the manufacture of the articles he handles.
There are three exceptions: (x) An act of negligence of a manufacturer.
which is imminently dangerous to life or health, committed in the preparation
of an article intended to preserve, destroy, or affect human life, is actionable
by third parties who suffer therefrom;-Thomas v. Winchester, supra. (2.)
An owner's act of negligence causing injury to one invited to use his defective
appliances on his premises makes him liable,-Heaven v. Pender, (1883), L.
R. xi Q. B. D. 503. (3.) One who delivers an article which he knows to be
imminently dangerous to life, to another without notice of its qualities, is
liable to any person who suffers an injury therefrom which might have been
reasonably 'anticipated. In this case the declaration alleged that P was in-
jured by the breaking of the defective running board over the cylinder of a
threshing machine which D knew was unsafe when he sold the machine to
P's employer. This was held sufficient on demurrer,-but the court remarked
that on the trial P probably would fail to prove D actually knew of the
defect.
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The courts have not yet arrived at any consistent theory of liability. The
Cadillac and Buick cases, above, put the defective touring cars in the class
of inherently dangerous things, but a Ford car is not such in Oklahoma,
(Ford Motor Car Co. v. Livesay, (Okl., i916), 16o Pac. 9o). A folding bed
is dangerous in California, (Lewis v. Terry, (1896), 111 Cal. 39), but an
ordinary bed is not in New York, (Field v. Empire & Co., (1918), 166 N. Y.
S. 509). A buggy is not in New York, (dicta in Thomas v. Winchester, supra),
but is in Georgia, (Woodward v. Miller (i9o4), ii9 Ga. 618). Step-ladders
are both in New York and in Minnesota, (Miller v. Steinfcld, (1917), i6o
N. Y. S. 8oo; Schubert v. Clark Co., (1892), 49 Minn. 331).
The Schubert and Buick cases, however, go a long way in establishing a
rule that the maker of a thing to be used in a certain way, owes a legal duty to
all who in the natural and ordinary course of events will probably use it in the
way designed, to exercise reasonable care in its manufacture, proportioned to
the danger from its use if defective, and is liable to such as are injured, when
properly using it without knowledge of the defect, because of its defective
condition, "although the maker did not personally know of the defect, had
no contract with the plaintiff, did "not fraudulently deceive him, and the
thing was not inherently dangerous otherwise than because of the defect.
This approaches the principle stated by Baz'r, M. L, (but not agreed to by
the other judges), in Heaven v. Pender, supra;--"Whenever one person is by
circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another that every
one of ordinary sense who did think would at once recognize that if he did
not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those
circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the person or property
of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger.'
The English courts still have difficulty with the problem. Earl v. Lubbock,
[i9o], 1 K. B. 253 (a van); Blacker v. Lake & Elliot, (1912), io6 L. T. 533
(a lamp); White v. Steadman [1913], 3 K. B. 340,-(a vicious horse) ; Bates
v. Batey & Co., [I93], 3 K. B. 351, (ginger-beer bottle); British So. African
Co. v. Lennon, (i9i5), 85 L. J. (P. C.) 1i (poison cattle dip). H. L. W.
